Through our history curriculum, Commonwealth students learn how to be historians rather than passive absorbers of facts. They read and analyze primary sources from a variety of voices in their historical contexts. And they graduate knowing that a single textbook could never tell the whole story. Core to this discovery process is an annual research paper that hones students’ analytical and writing skills and challenges them to dig deep into a variety of sources on any topic of interest, whether it be debunking the “primitivist” myth around jazz, the impact of the breakup of the AT&T monopoly, or, as you will see in this recent example from Peyson '25, how the complex relationship between the United States and Iran shaped the latter's political landscape—and the spread of communism—throughout the twentieth century.

On August 19, 1953, eight months after Eisenhower assumed office, the front page of Washington, D.C.’s Evening Star read in large letters “Mosaddegh Out, Teheran says: Radio Reports Royalist Revolt, Calls on Shah to Return Home.” In this article, the Associated Press shared the first official dispatch they had received from Tehran at 6:10 a.m.: “A royalist uprising in Premier Mosaddegh’s army and police flared in Tehran today with pitched battles in the center of the city.” The article went on to describe how, almost an hour after the first dispatch, the Associated Press received word that “Teheran broadcasts were heard in London that the government was overthrown.” A couple of hours later, the Tehran Radio officially—but also curtly—reported that royalists had overthrown the Iranian Government, Prime Minister Mosaddegh had fled for his life, and the people of Iran wanted the royal family, the Shah, to return, concluding (before abruptly playing the national anthem and going silent) with the declaration that “The Persian Nation’s officers, army, and the police have taken the situation in their hands.” According to the Evening Star, “The terse broadcast gave no details of the upset. All other communications with the Middle East oil capital were shut off.” When the Tehran radio broadcast returned hours later, a woman's voice could be heard telling the people of Iran: “Iranians love the Shah. Mossadegh is sending your country to the government of the hammer and sickle.”

Despite the purposefully matter-of-fact and simplified reports and radio transmissions sent to the U.K. and the U.S. throughout the day, the Evening Star did not take them at face value, instead turning its focus to how these statements were met with immediate uncertainty and confusion among officials and reporters. Firstly, many reports from Tehran earlier in the day contradicted the details they were given by official channels. For example, a report from the American Embassy in Tehran detailed that the crowds surrounding the city center were, at the very least, partly pro-Mosaddegh. From the details of these reports, many American and British officials also doubted that the radio shutdowns experienced throughout the day meant that anti-Mosaddegh forces had seized control of the station. Most of the initial confusion among reporters and officials, such as the Associated Press’s Foreign Correspondent Nate Polowetzky, came from how the official description of the government overthrow seemed to largely contradict what they already knew about the Iranian public’s attitude towards Mosaddegh. Polowetzky described how “only two days ago, [Mosaddegh] apparently still commanded the fanatical support of the little merchants in the bazaars the street brawlers” that earlier in the day supposedly crowded around the city capital demanding that Mosaddegh be removed. Polowetzky, highlighting the holes in these reports, satirically speculated that “unless Mossadegh overnight lost all this support, or unless the army revolted en masse and arrested all the old man’s chief lieutenants, it is difficult to imagine Mossadegh going down without a fight.”

As CNN explained, most of the details that have since become available about the United State's involvement in Operation Ajax have come from the CIA itself in 2011, when under the Freedom of Information Act, it was forced to release a number of inner records and documents relating to the coup. This included, as determined by the National Security Archive (NSA), the first formal recognition by the CIA of their involvement: according to Malcolm Byrne, the NSA’s editor of the documents released in 2011, the information released confirmed that “[t]he military coup that overthrew Mosaddegh and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government.” The U.S. has acknowledged that their role has also continued to evolve since 2011, with The Guardian stating that, across episodes of “The Langley Files,” the CIA’s 2023 podcast, CIA spokesmen admitted that the '53 Coup was an exception to the general trend of the CIA to promote democratically elected governments. Unfortunately, it is thought that much still remains hidden from the public, with historians such as Malcolm Byrne speculating that “it’s wrong to suggest that the coup operation itself has been fully declassified. Far from it.”

Although the declassification is still incomplete, we can see some of the previous understandings behind why the U.S. felt it was important to become directly involved in Iran’s government are incorrect. In the years following the coup, some historians, such as Bahman Nirumand in his 1969 Iran: The New Imperialism in Action, argued that business interests, particularly gaining access to Iran's oil, were the foremost reason for U.S. intervention. However, as historian Mark Gasiorowski argues, this view is limiting. U.S. companies had little incentive to expand to Iran, and Iran's heavy nationalism would have made an expansion incredibly difficult. Truman even offered anti-trust law exceptions to companies willing to expand in Iran, but few did. Instead, many historians, such as Gasiorowski, proposed the narrative that the principal incentives for the U.S.’s participation and the justification for using any means possible, going as far as staging a coup, were a result of U.S. anti-Communist foreign policy. However, this view only partially encapsulates all the factors that needed to align to make Operation Ajax possible. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, opinions on what the U.S.’s role in managing Communism in Iran looked like largely differed between government branches and administrations. Gasiorowski acknowledges that Truman did not believe Mosaddegh was susceptible to a Tudeh or Communist takeover, while on the other hand, eager to reaffirm anti-Communist foreign policy of the United States, Eisenhower likely saw Operation Ajax as a chance to show off his commitment to containing the Soviets. What Gasiorowski and other historians fail to include in their synopsis, however, was just how significant the tension between the ideas and objectives of the different actors involved, including Eisenhower and Truman, played a part in the culmination of the Coup. The recently declassified details, letters, and reports, in combination with U.S. foreign policy at the time, shed new light on not only the intensity of the tension between the views of the Eisenhower and Truman Administrations but also highlight the previously downplayed importance of the other independent actors involved. Independently and hidden from both administrations, the CIA was using propaganda in Iran, agitated by the idea of a Communist threat. The U.K., having lost their own long anti-oil nationalization battle with Mosaddegh, could not shake their grudge and were longing to see Mosaddegh gone. It was only when these actors and their agendas overlapped, with the newly elected Eisenhower’s hunger to fulfill his anti-Communism promises aligned with the CIA’s long-overflowing anxiety, all while feeling the subtle but consistent pressure from the U.K., did Operation Ajax become a possibility.

The U.S. only turned its attention to Iran in 1941 when its troops took advantage of Iran's close geological proximity to the USSR to increase the efficiency of its shipments to Russia and Europe during WWII. That same year, Iran, for the second time, became something close to a constitutional monarchy, with most of the power residing within the cabinet and parliament (Majlis) instead of the Shah, lasting until 1946. In the first few years of Truman’s presidency, the U.S.’s main interest in Iran remained its proximity to Russia, but now it was about ensuring Iran remained stable enough to keep Russia out, putting the goal of promoting democracy in the back seat. When Truman unexpectedly became president in 1945, he wanted to embed the new vision of America's foreign involvement and the Soviet Union into the official foreign policy. The issue was that he knew very little about it, leading him to turn to the persuasion of officials who did, many of whom had an extensive background in war and warfare. Worried about the weak state of Iran’s young constitution and parliament, Ambassador Morris of the U.S. recommended to Washington in 1945 that “the rise of a strong individual” would better ensure their anti-Communist and anti-Totalitarianism stance, even though the return to a monarchical style of leadership strongly went against U.S.’s founding promise of democracy and letting it develop on its own. Thus, with the support of the Shah, the U.S. helped appoint Prime Minister Qavam as their "strong individual" to combat the Soviet Communist influence and the small Communist Tudeh Party in 1946. However, only later that year, the United States became involved in the push for returning Iran to an autocratic leadership for the first time when they directly assisted the Shah in pushing out the democratically elected Qavam by threatening to arrest him for his methods of collaboration with different political parties, specifically the Communist-tied Tudeh, frustrating the Shah. The U.S. gained enough command over the army to help push out Qavam when they, in 1943, signed a treaty that allowed them to recommend appointments and dismissals of military officers to the Shah directly. The U.S. only had the ability to sign the treaty because, throughout the early 1940s, the Shah had been regaining power over the Iranian army in the background. Under threat of being arrested by the U.S. and the Shah, Qavam gave cabinet power to the Shah and, as a result, was relieved by the Majlis soon after in 1947. After 1949, when the Shah undemocratically amended the constitution to give themselves near complete control of the government, many U.S. officials and agencies started to support aiding the Shah, believing that the security that came with the rule of the Shah would be better at keeping out Communism than their attempted democracy would have. When Eisenhower became president in 1953, his administration adopted almost these same beliefs, immediately assuming that, before hearing from the CIA, the U.K., or planning a Coup, Mosaddegh's democratic control would not be stable or strong enough to combat any Communist influence effectively, although initially the issue was not urgent enough to require his focus. It is important to note that even while receiving the United States help in reclaiming positions of power in Iran in 1949, the Shah actively continued to ask for assistance, telling the United States that it would greatly support their fight against Communism, doing what they could to keep positive relations with the U.S. In 1949, The Iranian Embassy wrote to the Department of State to thank them for the military aid sent under the Military Aid Act but also to push for further “recognizing the importance of Iran’s strategic position and the vital role she has played and must continue to play in holding the line against Communist domination of the Middle East.” Part of this meant asking for more military aid, specifically hoping that their “share will be supplemented substantially from the $50 million credit left at the discretion of the President.” It also meant the Shah was asking the United States to help “resist Communist domination."

Although, with the help of the U.S., the Shah had regained power, they did not have the full support of the Iranian people. The leader of the opposition to the reinstated and U.S.-backed Shah was Mohammad Mosaddegh, who, long before becoming Prime Minister, was a prominent supporter of the constitution and openly opposed all monarchal control of Iran. He had long surrounded himself and participated in anti-Shah public sentiment before his time in office, even leading to his temporary exile in 1906 to Europe, where he studied law. In 1925, not long after his return, he was again exiled by the Shah on similar grounds, this time domestically. He was able to return to public life in 1944 and began to turn his attention towards nationalizing Iran's oil, to the frustration of England and their Anglo-Persian Oil Company. His party, the National Front, grew to be the most dominant political force by 1951. On April 29, 1951, the Shah, unable to fight the rising tide of public unease and pressure, appointed Mosaddegh Prime Minister and filled government positions with National Front members. Mosaddegh and the National Front’s first plan of action was to nationalize all oil production. A letter from American Henry Villard of the Policy Planning Staff sent to the U.S. Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff on May 24, 1951, only a month after the National Front attained power, explains that the situation in Iran was no longer approachable through diplomacy alone, describing how "nationalization has gone so far in the minds of the Iranians that there is no prospect whatever of a ‘negotiated’ settlement. Feeling is running so high that the best that might be salvaged from the present situation is an operating contract for the British, although even this is only a possibility.” A critical strategy used by Mosaddegh and the National Front to gain the majority of the public's support was to merge all pro-nationalizing oil parties under them. However, while they continued to define their beliefs as pro-constitution and pro-nationalizing oil, the National Front strongly refused to include any parties with Communist ties under their umbrella, such as the then- small but prominent Communist Tudeh party, regardless of their opinion on oil. Frustrated by their nationalization efforts, the British pressured the British-favoring Shah to replace Mosaddegh, but there was little the Shah could do to oppose such a strong universal sentiment among the Iranian People.

The Truman Administration made it clear in 1951 through interviews and efforts to delay responses that they disagreed with the Shah and England’s pressure to remove Mosaddegh, instead suggesting to give Mosaddegh more time and trusting the National Front to deal with oil agreements and hoping to keep the U.S. uninvolved. However, Truman, like the U.S. public, was by no means uninterested in foreign affairs. With the worldwide advancements of international warfare and threats that came in the mid-1940s, particularly the development of the atom bomb and the growth of a multinational and interconnected world, it became clear to Americans that their pre-WWII isolationist mindset could no longer ensure their protection and longevity. This recognition abruptly changed the future of American foreign policy. The Soviet Union proved to be the source of the most worry and acted as the primary catalyst for the U.S. to increase its intervention in foreign activities and relations. Both citizens and officials jointly saw the future of U.S. foreign policy being focused on protecting themselves against the Soviet Union and its new arsenal of weapons, now on par with the U.S’s. The changing foreign policy of the U.S., spearheaded by fear of the Soviets, did not just come in the form of a military threat, but also via the Soviets' own foreign policy. Stalin was actively, at least in the eyes of American officials, overstepping in his pursuit of Soviet interests, such as becoming involved in foreign elections. In 1944, America's ambassador to the USSR sent back a frightening summary of Russia's foreign policy, claiming “there is every indication that the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever their interests are involved" if the U.S. does not intervene. On February 22, 1946, George Kennan, the future representative of the Secretary of State and Counselor to the U.S. Department of State, sent Truman a telegram from Moscow, which would later be known as the “Long Telegram.”

Similar to the 1944 letter from the Ambassador to the USSR, the Long Telegram advised Truman that in order to combat the "World Communism" that "is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue," the U.S. must "formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of the sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security." Less than a month later, the Truman Administration defined its foreign policy as proper containment of all Soviet and communist spread. On March 12, Truman stood before Congress and delivered the Truman Doctrine Speech, which asked for permission to act in the Mediterranean in order to limit any outside anti-Democratic influence. In reality, this was in response to the growing fear that the Mediterranean was becoming actively influenced by Stalin's communist ideology. In Truman's own words, "the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by communists...Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must apply this assistance." The way Truman saw it, "the free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world." It was the job of the U.S. to stop communist influence in order to “assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way." Truman's plea passed by a large majority in both the House and Senate.

Despite the importance of preventing the spread of communism that Truman and the rest of Congress strongly backed, the CIA, founded in 1947 by the Truman administration, was struggling to fight communism abroad, most notably, unable to suppress the Italian Communist Party. Understanding a need for increased foreign operations to ensure the containment of communism, the National Security Council began to largely expand the powers and budget of the CIA, with the budget for CIA operations growing by 1500% from 1949–1952. In a memo titled "National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects," authored on behalf of the National Security Council on June 18, 1948, Kennan describes that after "taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR," the NSC came to the conclusion that “in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the overt foreign activities of the U.S. government must be supplemented by covert operations." In the words of Kennan himself, these "'covert operations' are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups," and that they could include the usage of "propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas, and refugee liberation groups; and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world" on the sole condition that "if uncovered the U.S. government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."

These reforms were laid out and applied to new priorities laid out by the Truman Doctrine in the National Security Council’s top-secret 68th Report, the NSC-68, sent to Truman in 1950. The NSC-68’s purpose was to emphasize to Truman how the Soviet forces the CIA was fighting in foreign states did not abide by morals shared by the U.S. As historian John Lewis Gaddis describes, the NSC-68 was, from then on, seen as the CIA’s justification for abandoning U.S. morals and laws on foreign soil to ensure the protection of a free society. The NSC explained that the U.S. needed to use any means necessary to fight the Kremlin, being "the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world" when the Kremlin "design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and ultimate elimination of any effective opposition." Unfortunately, in the eyes of the NSC, "the free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends." But the disregard of previous morals and laws, the "resort to force, internally or externally...including the use of military force" was permissible on the particular grounds that "when one individual or groups of individuals within [a free society] threaten the basic rights of other individuals or when another society seeks to impose its will upon it." However, they must be "not so excessive or misdirected as to make us enemies of the people instead of men who have enslaved them." Further, the act of intervention "must commend itself to the overwhelming majority as an inescapable exception to the basic ideas of freedom; or the regenerative capacity of free men after the act has been performed will be endangered." Thus, considering Mosaddegh’s efforts to focus on nationalizing oil and intention to remain free from communist influence, it is not surprising that, despite the strong anti-communism beliefs laid out in the Truman Doctrine and expansion of U.S. means of foreign intervention with NSC-68, that Truman chose to give Mosaddegh and his democracy time and was opposed to getting involved.

However, in the early 1950s, Truman’s own CIA did not share his faith in the National Front’s ability to fight communism. By 1951, the CIA was almost entirely concerned over the possibility of a communist takeover. In a warning sent to the CIA on September 13, 1951, concerning the “current strength of the Tudeh party in Iran,” the Office of Intelligence and Research concluded that "at the present time, Tudeh is not capable of seizing control. Given a continuation of the present economic deterioration and/or the replacement of the Mosadeq government by one willing to reestablish the British economic position within Iran, it is possible that that capability may exist by the early part of 1952," grouping the Tudeh with other pro-nationalist groups. Less than a month later, on October 9, 1951, in a summary of their efforts in Iran, the CIA defined their “primary mission” as working to “counter Tudeh communist activities and awaken Iranian authorities to communism’s dangers," while also moving away from Truman, stating that they are “unable to affect the immediate political crisis in Iran, which can only be resolved by diplomatic means.” Three days later, while re-emphasizing their concern of Trudeh’s actions, the CIA acknowledged the difference between their goals and actions from the general Truman administration’s in a telegram sent from their station in Iran to their headquarters in the U.S. with a header that read, “it is specifically requested that no distribution of this report be made outside of the Agency.” Although they admitted lacking adequate inside information on the Tudeh, the station reported to the CIA that the Tudeh’s recent movements, such as how they had “organized workers in Abadan to a point where they successfully staged a general strike” and “quickly took advantage of the ineptitude of British labor relations in Abadan to stage another successful general strike,” could contribute to the CIA’s concern that “the Soviet Union is in a relatively strong position to reap advantages'' of Iran’s political arena.

With this scare over a communist takeover dominating the CIA, it was not long before they began losing faith in Mosaddegh himself. In a secret Special Estimate written as a summary of the development of the Oil Nationalization, the CIA concluded that Mosaddegh was "an impractical visionary and a poor administrator," and that it was "unlikely that he will do very much to solve the country’s critical economic and social problems." Despite Mosaddegh's clear efforts to separate his National Party from the Tudeh, the same secret telegram from the CIA’s station in Iran declared Mosaddegh’s government as a “prisoner of the streets,” controlled in the shadows by “the followers of Mullah Kashani and the Tudeh Party (with satellite fronts), both of which are exploiting to the fullest a wave of genuine nationalistic feelings of a broad section of the upper middle class…of the two the more powerful is undoubtedly the Tudeh Party." Echoing the Truman Doctrine, the CIA telegram stated how they believed "the policy of the National Front at this time plays directly into Soviet hands'' for “it has undermined the prestige of the Anglo-Saxon powers in the Near East" and "lays the groundwork for a common front of nationalists in the Near East against Anglo-Saxon 'imperialists.'" In 1952, largely unknown to Truman, the CIA had started using a series of secret political propaganda actions designed to influence and combat possible communist groups under the name BEDAMN. Although remaining within the lines of what was detailed in the NSC-68, BEDAMN was largely used by the CIA to give the National Front a bad name, contrary to the Truman Administration's stance of favoring any means of staying politically uninvolved. Thus, by 1952, due to the effectiveness of BEDAMN, along with British pressure and the party’s own recognition of how ambitious the nature of their goals seemed in such a young democracy, the groups that had initially come together under the National Front had started to split, and the party was in shambles. The initial usage of the BEDAMN program, which later became the basis of the U.S.’s involvement, seemed to be the CIA's own rogue development outside of Truman’s knowledge.

The tension and unrest between Truman and the CIA only continued to grow, and the anxiety behind the possibility of communism spreading through Iran started expanding to other branches of the government, leaving them eager for action that Truman was not going to give them. In the final months of Truman’s presidency, the CIA saw the issue of a Tudeh takeover as not only incredibly urgent but also impossible to combat with their current military capabilities. In a letter from their Deputy Director for Plans Frank Wisner to the then Director of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith sent on August 8, 1952, concerning the possibility of “arming Iranian tribal groups,” the CIA assessed that their current “capabilities in Iran are insufficient to prevent a Tudeh coup should such be attempted," and should thus “make preparations for combating, by paramilitary methods, the efforts of communist elements to seize control in Iran." Unfortunately, the twenty-five-page detailed plan remains censored. Concern over a possible communist takeover was starting to spread to other departments and branches, particularly the Department of State. In a paper attached to a letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to the Secretary of State Dean Acheson on September 10, 1952, concerning "Recommended Change in United States Policy Toward Iran," the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs highlights how "over the past few years the communists have concentrated on developing a disciplined nucleus of leaders with a comparatively numerous screen of front organizations. Agitators are known to be circulating among the peasants, and there are believed to be communist cells in every Iranian industry and most dangerously among the unemployed oil workers in Abadan'' where Tudeh was already previously active. While they claimed, based on reports from the Embassy, that "the communist organization will probably not attempt to stage a violent outbreak against the nationalist government," they believed the communist presence in Iran would instead "look for opportunities to infiltrate and pervert the nationalist movement." Yet, be there any change in government structure or if the "public confidence in the nationalist government weakens and if the armed forces become demoralized, it is entirely possible that the communists may consider it advisable to attempt direct action to gain control." Assistant Secretary of State Byroade clearly stated that they see a communist coup as inevitable: "all agree that if the economic and social conditions of Iran worsen hopelessly, a communist coup must eventually be expected." They also expressed frustration with Truman's previous lack of support in the U.K., saying that the newly suggested "United States policy toward Iran” had been “influenced by an understanding that the United Kingdom is responsible for the initiative in military support of Iran in the event of communist subversion" only exists because of the "United States's inability to extend its military responsibilities at the present time and upon the extensive influence which the British had in Iran before nationalization of the oil industry.” Byroade felt that this now left both the U.S. and the U.K. dealing with a situation in Iran where the "British influence in Iran has been so completely destroyed that it is now very doubtful whether any legitimate Iranian government would or even could request British assistance in the event of a communist seizure of power," given that Iranian leader Nasser Khan Qashqai had even claimed a few weeks prior that “we would prefer the Russians to the British." In a letter likely written in October of 1952 from England, sent to the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, the U.K. acknowledges and agrees with the United States on the pressing issue of "possible openings for Tudeh," including "a coup planned in advance and aimed at the seizure of vital points in Tehran" or "a tactical alliance between one faction of the National Front and the Tudeh, leading to increased penetration by, and the ultimate predominance of, the latter." In order to address the growing concern, the U.K. suggested a series of "possible courses of action," claiming that "our most useful means of pressure is financial (but depends on complete Anglo–United States solidarity and on making no offer of help in haste or without exacting conditions) accompanied by covert propaganda" and even, in response to an "establishment of a Tudeh regime," the possibility of an "overt military intervention," although noting that "under present circumstances, this would be difficult to justify in the eyes of the world and might be very difficult from a military point of view." However, in the commented version sent to the Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of State Byroade highlights how the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, the NEA, holds an understanding that the "covert propaganda" suggested by the U.K., "a campaign of 'covert propaganda aimed at stiffening the government and increasing its anti-Tudeh activities' has been in progress for some time" and that "certainly, this course of action should be continued," suggesting that even though the NEA was “not fully aware of the type of covert activity presently carried on in Iran," they believed the little they did know about CIA and their existing covert BEDAMN efforts was in accordance with foreign policy such as the NSC-68 and supported continuing efforts. Although mentions of the possibility of the Tudeh working with the National Front were becoming more prevalent and more concerning to both the U.K. and the U.S., it's clear that just months before Operation Ajax, the anti-communist efforts in Iran remained mostly focused on keeping out Tudeh influence rather than deciding it was necessary to instead turn on the now weaker but still not communist Mosaddegh. When Eisenhower assumed office in 1953, however, Mosaddegh’s weakening position in Iran, largely due to BEDAMN and other pressures, and the possible susceptibility to communist influence that came with it, became the prominent concern of the U.S. actors.

By 1953, the U.S. actors, with Eisenhower having now replaced Truman, seemed to agree that they had lost faith in the chance of Mosaddegh succeeding. In the 1998 Inner-CIA Report "Zendebad Shah!" released as part of the 2011 declassifications, the CIA admitted that the recently elected Eisenhower was initially uninterested in Iran. It was only when the British approached and convinced the CIA that the situation in Iran was still pressing that Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles suggested the idea of becoming directly involved with Eisenhower. Although the U.K. saw the situation in Iran as more stable than the U.S. did, was less concerned about the government and the threat of Soviet or communist influence and more about the oil and settlement side, the U.K. still felt deeply humiliated by the National Front’s successful efforts in nationalizing oil and continued to play with the idea of ousting Mosaddegh long after the situation settled. However, without the support or permission of the United States, ousting Mosaddegh seemed off the table. The U.K. had unsuccessfully attempted to reach Truman on multiple occasions due to his commitment to remaining a mediator. Even in the final months of Truman’s presidency, in light of Eisenhower's recent win, the steady increase of U.S. concern over possible communist influence in Iran, and the CIA’s rouge and independent actions, the Truman Administration stood strong on their original commitment to trusting Mosaddegh and his democracy, turning away the British’s suggestions. Thus, the switch to Eisenhower’s Administration in 1953 provided new hope to the British. Backed by both support and positive claims from Allen Dulles and the CIA regarding the possibility that Eisenhower might sway with convincing, the U.K. approached Eisenhower with a plan only a few months into his presidency. U.K. Representative Anthony walked into the meeting with the Eisenhower Administration, ready to make an attempt to convince the U.S. to help on the basis that Mosaddegh was actively destroying “British prestige, influence, and vital commercial interest.” Although the commercial interest of Iran, oil, was never a big factor for the U.S., to Eden's surprise, it took Eisenhower little convincing to agree. The failed negotiations between the U.K. and Mosaddegh had left a bad taste in Eisenhower's mouth, and unlike Truman, he saw the incident as reason to consider Mosaddegh as incredibly unstable and largely susceptible to Soviet influence. Having finally convinced the U.S. Cabinet to consider the possibility of using the powers of covert action established in the NSC-68, the U.K. worked with the U.S. to chose Zahedi, leader of an opposing, right-leaning party to Mosaddegh’s National Front, to help overthrow and replace Mosaddegh. Zahedi had the two qualities the U.S. saw were necessary for a successful replacement: he had a significant following they could take advantage of and was openly anti-Mosaddegh. Despite the CIA’s significantly more positive relations with the Eisenhower administration compared to the Truman administration, the CIA had already recently decided, secretly and on its own, that a coup was necessary and already had Zahedi on their list of possible actors. Although Eisenhower’s careful attention to remaining uninvolved in the planning, having only been present for the final few meetings and official confirmation might make him seem disconnected or unaware of the Coup, his input was likely included from the very start. As biographer Stephan Ambrose explains, “Eisenhower participated in none of the meetings that set up Ajax; he received only oral reports on the plan; and he did not discuss it with his Cabinet or the NSC…he kept his distance and left no documents behind that could implicate the president in any projected coup. But in the privacy of the Oval Office, over cocktails, he was kept informed by Foster Dulles, and he maintained a tight control over the activities of the CIA.” Thus, the plan, with full support from all parties, each to their own reasoning, was quickly approved. Soon after its official approval, the CIA began utilizing BEDAMN propaganda to destroy Mosaddegh's public image using riots, and then, with the help of the Shah, forced Mosaddegh to resign. It was not hard for the CIA to add to Mosaddegh’s already weakening public image, and after getting the Shah to sign off on the appointment of Zahedi and a very messy saga of military action to arrest Mosaddegh, Zahedi was finally appointed as Prime Minister.

The understanding that the U.S.’s deeply engrained anti-communist theology was behind the country's choice to involve themselves in the Iranian coup is not incorrect. Without the general public's fear over the possible spread of communism not only at home but abroad, or Truman’s speech to the Senate and reports from the National Security Council defining U.S. foreign policy as the containment of communism's influence through all necessary means, the U.S. would have likely never considered a coup, or at the very least, have been able to justify one. Yet, without Truman’s insistence on trusting democracy and the hidden unrest and frustration that these views brewed within the CIA over the course of multiple years, the anti-communist agenda of the United States would not have been enough to justify a coup. Similarly, without the U.K.’s longstanding grudge against Mosaddegh, completely unrelated to the CIA’s anxiety over communism, it is unlikely that Eisenhower and the CIA would have worked together to overthrow Mosaddegh. Thus, highlighting the distinct incentives of these different actors, fueled by their own doubt and skepticism and multiplied by a lack of clarity and communication, becomes a necessity in understanding how, under the umbrella term of “anti-communism,” the U.S. justified a complete overhaul of a democratic government, an ugly truth it took more than fifty years to admit to.

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Bibliography

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